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Abstract  A theoretical model focusing on the interaction between safety and
fishery regulation is introduced in order to discuss the fishing units’ behavior
and the public policies’ effect upon fatality rates and cost efficiency in the in-
dustry. The optimal welfare outcomes for a nontransferable and transferable
vessel quota regime are compared and possible advantages and disadvantages
of practicing these fishery regulations are identified. Among other things, the
authors recommend the public authorities pay attention to moral hazard effects
which may follow when the levels of public risk reducing services are increased.
Key words  Catch and safety regulation, moral hazard, nontransferable and
transferable quotas.
Introduction
In Norway the fishing industry has the highest fatality rate of all major occupations
(Aasjord 1993). The explanation for this seems evident; the Norwegian fishing fleet
operates in areas with rapidly changing natural conditions where strong winds,
frigid waters, darkness, and ice constitute a considerable risk for material damages,
injuries, and loss of lives. These physical conditions at sea reflect stochastic vari-
ables which cannot be affected by any human being. However, researchers, politi-
cians, and other experts have been interested in how fishermen and public authori-
ties can reduce the number of fatalities in the industry [see, for instance, Norges
Offentlige Utredninger (NOU) 1986; Norwegian Association of Fishermen 1992;
and Farstad 1993]. Participants in the debate seem to agree that captains and crew
members of the fishing units can influence the degree of actual fishing risks. Both
investment decisions (determining the shape and the size of a vessel) and operating
decisions (such as deciding when and where to fish, what kind of and how much
fishing tackle, number of crew and hours on duty) affect the actual probabilities of
accidents. Furthermore, it is believed that accident risks are also influenced by the
level of public services supplied to the operating vessels (such as navigation and
communication systems) and by weather forecasts and published charts. In addition,
public authorities can increase safety and reduce the consequences of accidents by
setting certain types of standards (concerning the stability of the vessel, obligatory
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survival suits, rescue service, etc.). In the exchange of views regarding safety regu-
lations, it has also been argued that the public authorities’ policy of regulation indi-
rectly affects the fatality rates in the fishing industry by affecting the daily work of
fishermen (see for instance Farstad 1993; and Bergland 1995).
Motivated by the well-known need to regulate total effort and total catch volume
in common property fisheries (theoretically described in the review by Munro and
Scott 1985) and the experience of reduced stocks when fishing was unregulated, the
fishery authorities in Norway have in recent years made use of different kinds of
regulatory instruments such as license limitation programs, nontransferable vessel
quotas, and sometimes contests between fishermen within a global harvest quota. In
addition, there is currently an on-going debate whether public authorities, in order to
improve efficiency in the fishing industry, should allow fishermen to buy and sell in-
dividual vessel quotas.
Based on the discussions of choosing a safety and catch regulation for the fish-
ing industry in Norway, one may ask: (i) Is it necessary for public authorities to be
concerned about safety in fishing operations at all? (ii) If public authorities spend
resources on safety regulations in the fishing industry, how do the fishing units re-
act? and (iii) does the actual choice of fishery regulation influence the probabilities
of accidents in the industry? In order to discuss these questions regarding regula-
tions for the fishing industry, we will in the next section adopt a theoretical model
describing how the fishing firm’s practice and the public authorities’ choice of pub-
lic services affect production possibilities and risks. Furthermore, this model will be
used to deduce a first-best optimal welfare outcome defined by a certain level of ef-
fort inserted in the production and safety by each of the fishing units, as well as a
certain level of public services supplied to the fishing industry given a predeter-
mined total catch volume (supposed to be the harvest which maximizes the eco-
nomic or sustainable yield in the fishery). Implicitly, this first-best solution will
characterize a socially preferable catch distribution among the vessels when both
productivity and safety issues are taken into account. The following section consid-
ers what we call feasible public policies where the authorities are supposed to
choose levels of public services supplied to the industry before the fishing units
choose the levels of effort which maximize their expected profits. In order to focus
on the effect the actual choice of fishery regulation might have on the safety in the
industry, this analysis is carried out in relation to both transferable and nontransfer-
able quota systems. Finally, after the different results are discussed and compared,
the last section draws some conclusions.
The Model and Optimal Welfare Outcome Given a Global Catch Target
In order to analyze behavior in the fishing industry and the socially preferable out-
come, we will present a simple model describing how the firm’s choices of inputs
and the public authority’s choice of safety installations will affect production and
risks, and thereby the expected profits stemming from the fishery. The model is in-
spired by the seminal work on traffic safety regulation by Peltzman (1975) and later
applied by several economists to discuss different kinds of moral hazard problems
following from public interventions (see, for instance, Diamond 1977; Viscusi 1979,
1985; Blomquist 1986; Shavell 1987; Jones-Lee 1989; Risa 1992; and Jørgensen
1993). First, we suppose that a typical fishing firm f faces an exogenous production
technology given by the function




































where R is firm f’s catch volume, v is a vector describing firm f’s choice of inputs
and s is measuring the fishing authorities’ choice of installations used by all of the
firms in their production, such as the quantity and quality of the charts, weather
forecasts, and radio-signals used by the operators in navigating and communicating.
In order to simplify the analyses, however, s is considered as a uniform variable
which appears as a public good in the fishing industry. Moreover, the production
function in equation (1) is assumed to have the standard neoclassical characteristics
(i.e., increasing and concave in the arguments). Second, we introduce the prevention
technology for the fishing firm f by the function
pp n z s ff f f = (,, ) (2)



























where pf is the probability of an accident in fishing firm f. Furthermore, it is as-
sumed that higher levels of public services will reduce the accident risks in the fish-
ing industry. For the sake of simplicity, we will only specify two types of inputs
chosen by each of the firms, v = (n, z), where n describes an input which is safety-
improving, i.e., number of men or level of care taken by the fishing operator, and z
is an input which is safety-worsening, i.e., the work intensity, the fishing time, or
the number of fishing tackles used by the boat. In the case of an accident, the total
loss for boat f, Lf, is assumed to be the sum of the private or internal loss experi-
enced by the operator,  Li
f , (e.g., costs of missed catch, fishing tackles, and other
capital equipment) and the external costs,  Le
f  experienced by the public sector (e.g.,
the costs of search and rescue operations), other firms (e.g., more expensive accident
insurance) and family and friends who experience negative economic and social
losses if the accident causes fatal or serious injuries to the life or health of any crew
members. The distribution of the total loss on internal and external loss for a fishing
boat is dependent on the insurance contract. Higher levels of insurance will reduce
the internal loss and increase the external costs. Furthermore, it is likely that the dis-
tribution of loss is dependent on whether members of the crew are owners and there-
fore decision makers in the firm. If an owner is a member of the crew and is injured,
it is likely that the possible losses experienced by families and friends are internalized
and therefore can be considered as internal losses. However, in the opposite case, where
the owner does not participate in the fishing operations, it is likely that possible
losses to the crew members and their relatives must be considered as external costs
if an accident occurs. Without respect to the distribution of the costs in the case of
an accident, we assume for the sake of simplicity, that the size of the total loss is
independent of the action actually chosen by the firm and the public authority.
Furthermore, it is assumed that the public authority supplying the safety-im-
proving technology s used by the fishing firms has costs which can be specified by the
function C = C(s), where the costs are increasing and convex in the argument, i.e.,
C′ (s) > 0 and C″ (s) ≥  0. We can now define the expected profit of fishing firm f byBergland and Pedersen 284
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where we have normalized the fixed price of the fish to 1 and where w and q are the
prices of the safety-improving and safety-worsening inputs respectively. If we as-
sume that there are F fishing firms in the industry, the welfare stemming from the
activity can be defined by
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= ∑ 1  =  R, yields the following necessary conditions for a first-best optimal wel-
fare allocation of the resources in the industry
























































where λ  is the marginal resource rent. It is easily seen from equation (4) that in the
case where the firm’s choices of inputs do not influence upon the accident risks and
there is a nonbinding resource condition (λ  = 0), we get the standard first order condi-
tions. The value of the marginal product of each of the inputs chosen by the firm should
be equal to the input prices and aggregated value of the marginal product of the public
services for all operating firms should be equal to the marginal cost of supplying public
services. If the resource condition is binding, the social value of catching an extra unit
of fish is given by (1 – λ ), implying the marginal values of the products, in welfare
terms, is reduced compared to the nonbinding case. Furthermore, if the probability
of an accident is affected by the actual choices of the private and public inputs, there
will be additional expected social costs by using the safety-worsening input z and
additional expected social gains by using the safety-increasing inputs n and s.
Feasible Public Policies
If the welfare allocation discussed above is to be used to design a policy for the fish-
ing industry, the public regulator must know the individual firm’s production and
prevention functions in equations (1) and (2), and, additionally, be able to choose
the levels of inputs in all firms. Therefore, it is practically impossible for a public
authority to implement the first-best optimal welfare allocation directly. Feasible
policies must be based on fishing firms which individually choose levels of private
inputs and a public authority choosing the size of the public supply of installations
affecting production and safety conditions in the industry. Furthermore, it is be-
lieved that fishing firms, before they adjust the quantities of private inputs, can ob-
serve and react to the chosen levels of public services. The equilibrium of such a
two-stage principal agent game, where the authority (principal) first chooses public
supply of effort, improving productivity and safety in the industry, whereafter theCatch Regulation and Accident Risk 285
fishing operators (agents) decide upon levels of private inputs, can be found by
backward induction. First, we will characterize the fishing firm’s optimal behavior,
given that they all maximize expected profits for a given supply of public input and
given a certain quota regime. The conditions describing the firm’s optimal behavior
are discussed in the case where the quotas are transferable, and in the case where
such transfers are illegal. Moreover, the firm’s possible response on changes in pub-
lic supply of the safety and production improving input are analyzed. Second, the
authority’s optimal choice of public services when quotas are transferable and when
quotas are nontransferable, given the fishing firm’s possible reactions on changes in
the levels of public services, is analyzed. Finally, we compare feasible public poli-
cies in the case of transferable and nontransferable vessel quotas by referring to the
first-best allocation deduced in the previous section of this paper.
The Firm’s Optimal Behavior and Their Responses to Changed Levels of
Public Input
If the vessel quotas are nontransferable, the problem for a risk-neutral fishing firm
will be to maximize the firm’s expected profits with respect to the individually con-
trolled inputs, given the size of quota and the level of public input, i.e.,
m a x (,,) (,,)
, nz
fff f f ff
i
f
ffR n z s wn qz p n z s L 00 −− − []
given
Rnzs r fff f (,,) 0 ≤
where r f must be interpreted as the size of the exogenous vessel quota decided by
the fishing authority. Furthermore, if the quotas are transferable between the vessels,
the problem of a fishing firm can be formulated by
m a x (,,) (,,) (,,)
, nz
f f f f f f ff ff f
i
f
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where r f is still the size of the quota given to fishing firm f, but now the firm can
choose to sell (some of) the available catch or buy additional quotas from other ves-
sels. The price for each unit sold or bought, k, is assumed to be a price which clears
the quota market.1
In general, the conditions defining the equilibria under these two quota regimes
can be formulated by










































1 Alternatively, this problem could have been formulated as individual maximizations of the fishing
firm’s expected profits, given that the total catch quantity is less than or equal to the sum of the indi-
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where λ f in the case of nontransferable quotas must be interpreted as the potential
gain in expected profit in firm f by allowing this firm to catch an additional unit,
generally varying among the operators (λ f ≠  λ g, f, g = 1, …, F, f ≠  g), and interpreted
as the quota price k, faced by all of the firms in the case of transferable quotas, (λ f =
k, ∀ f  = 1, …, F).
Under both quota regimes it is seen from equation (5) that the marginal rate of
substitution between the two private inputs in firm f, (∂ Rf/∂ zf)/(∂ Rf/∂ nf), will in equi-
librium be equal to [q + (∂ pf/∂ zf) Li
f ]/[w + (∂ pf/∂ nf) Li
f ]. Compared to the optimal
welfare conditions in equation (4), given that firm f faces a lower private loss in the
case of an accident than the total social loss, i.e.,  Le
f  > 0, it is seen that the private
operator would use too much of the safety-worsening input z and too little of the safety-
increasing input n for any catch level. This result follows from the existence of an exter-
nality. In fact, the externality affects both the use of n and z. Firstly, if a private firm
increases the safety-worsening input (z), it will experience a higher increase in pri-
vate expected profits than the effect this higher level of z has on expected social wel-
fare. This will result in lower private than social expected costs in the fishing indus-
try. Secondly, an increase in the private safety-increasing input (n) means higher ex-
pected welfare than the increase in the firm’s expected profits. This effect means
higher private expected costs in the fishing industry than the expected social costs.
Hence, whether we have a positive or negative externality concerning the firm’s
catch quantities, is conditional on the sizes of the effects commented on above.
In general, it is seen that the distribution of the total catch might result in ineffi-
ciency in the fishing industry. In the case of nontransferable quotas this is obvious.
The public authority, which ex ante gives each of the fishing firms a quota, does not
know the production and prevention functions of all firms in detail, and is therefore
unable to distribute the total catch efficiently, which is characterized by the condi-
tion that the marginal social welfare with regard to the size of the catch should be
equal for all vessels. However, let us first compare the catch distribution for the two
quota regime. It is easily seen that if k ≥ (<)λ f, then rf ≥ (<) Rf(nf, zf, s), i.e., when the
marginal profit gain in catching an extra unit for the firm in the case of nontransfer-
able quotas is lower (higher) than the quota price, the catch quantity will be lower
(higher) in the transferable than the nontransferable case. Thus, the fishing firm,
given the quota rf, will sell some of the catch quantity (buy an additional catch quan-
tity) if it becomes legal.
Let us now compare the first-best welfare allocation and the outcome in the case
of transferable quotas. If it is legal to transfer quotas, the expected private profits for
the last caught units will be the same for all fishing firms in equilibrium (equal to k),
but the expected welfare gain for the last unit caught on a vessel might be different
from the marginal social welfare. If k >(<) λ , the equilibrium in the case of a trans-
ferable quota regime, where the firms individually maximize expected private prof-
its, is characterized by fishing firms which on average underestimate the expected
marginal social costs regarding the usage of the safety-worsening input more (less),
then they underestimate the expected marginal social utility regarding the usage of
the safety-increasing input. In other words, the private marginal cost in catching the
last unit given the transferable quota regime is lower (higher) than the social mar-
ginal costs. If the difference between the expected marginal social welfare and the
profit is negative (positive) and identical for all fishing firms, the total allowable
catch will be efficiently distributed among the operating vessels, but the quota price
over (under) estimates the social value of the last unit caught. In general, however, it
is believed that the differences between the social and private marginal gain may
vary among the fishing units, implying an inefficient catch distribution. If k >(<) λ ,
the firms, characterized by the highest deviations between their private and their so-
cial marginal costs, will catch too much (less) in the transferable quota regime comparedCatch Regulation and Accident Risk 287
to the first best welfare optimal distribution of the total allowable catch quantity.
The conditions defining the fishing firm’s optimal behavior above will hold for
any level of the public input s, i.e., the individually optimal levels of n and z, de-
fined by equation (5), are functions of the public input s, nf = nf(s) and zf = zf(s), f =
1, …, F. It then follows that the impact of changed public supply on a firm’s behav-
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The signs of the expressions stated above are the sufficient conditions for the maxi-
mum solutions defined by equation (5). Moreover, to be able to determine the signs
of dnf/ds and dzf/ds, it is seen from equation (6) that we have to make further as-
sumptions concerning the production and prevention functions. First of all, it seems
likely that π zs
f  > 0 because  Rzs
f  > 0 and  pzs
f  < 0. Positive  Rzs
f  means that z and s are
presumed to be technical complements, i.e., as s becomes higher, the productivity of
the firm’s safety-worsening input increases. For instance this condition reflects that
better weather forecasting and navigation systems make any levels of the firm’s fish-
ing tackles more effective in production. Furthermore, negative  pzs
f  implies that as s
becomes higher, the less influence a marginal change in z has on the probability of
loss. If the assumption concerning π zs above holds, in isolation, an increase in the
public services will lead to increased quantity of the safety-worsening input, which
increases the probability for accidents. However, the total effect of increased public
services will also be conditional on the signs and sizes of  π ns
f  and π nz
f , which are
more difficult to determine based on reasonable presumptions. However, it follows
from equation (6) that if π zs
f  > 0 and the signs of π ns
f  and π nz
f  are generally ambigu-
ous, it is possible to illustrate the effects on the private inputs for marginal changes
in s in the table below.
From table 1 it is seen that even though we restrict our discussions to cases
where π zs > 0, generally we cannot draw any conclusions regarding the signs of
dzf/ds and dnf/ds. For instance, the direct positive effect on z caused by an increase
in s might be dominated by a negative indirect effect. Higher s will also affect z
through a changed level of n, and when π ns > 0 and π nz < 0, or π ns < 0, and π nz > 0,
this (indirect) effect will be negative, resulting in an unambiguous sign of the total
effect measured by dzf/ds.
As already noticed, the direct effect on n caused by an increase in s might be
positive, zero, or negative conditional on whether π ns > 0, π ns = 0, or π ns < 0.
Whether the sign of the total effect on n for changed levels of public services isBergland and Pedersen 288
positive, zero, or negative, however, is also conditional on the sign and size of the
indirect effect s has on n through a changed level of z.
In our further discussions we will pay special attention to the cases where there
is a moral hazard problem, i.e., that the fishermen behave in a way which increases
risks. From table 1, it is seen that such a behavior is generally found when π ns ≤  0
and π nz ≤  0 (in addition to π zs > 0). Higher supply of public services then induces the
firm to increase z and to reduce n (unchanged if the equalities occur), which means
higher probabilities for losses. Hence, a sufficient condition for this double moral
hazard problem to arise is that the marginal expected profit with respect to n is de-
creasing in z and s.
For simplicity, if we believe that  pnz
f  =  pns
f  = 0, in other words, that the marginal
reduction in the probability of loss with respect to n is independent of z and s, the
sufficient condition holds when the pairs n and s and n and z are substitutes in pro-
duction ( Rns
f  < 0 and  Rnz
f  < 0).
It should be remarked that even though such a double moral hazard problem
may exist, the total effect on the probability of loss for a fishing unit caused by
















i.e., that the direct reduction in the accident probability caused by an increase in
public input dominates the possible increase in the accident probability this effect
indirectly causes though changed levels of the private inputs.
Table 1
Effects on Private Inputs Caused by Marginal
Changes in Public Services when π zs > 0.
π nz
f < 0 π nz
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Optimal Level of Public Services, Given the Firm’s Individual Behavior
When the public authorities choose the level of installations affecting the safety and
production conditions among operating vessels, they know the individual reactions
to the private inputs discussed above. In the case of nontransferable quotas, the pub-
lic authority’s problem will be to maximize











with respect to s, given that Rf[nf(s), zf(s), s] ≤  rf, f = 1, …, F.
In the case of transferable quotas, the problem can be formulated by
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where k is determined by










The first order condition defining the public authority’s (or the principal’s) opti-
mal choice of s, when the fishing units (or the agents) have the possibility to re-





















































































































































where λ f ≠  λ g, f, g = 1, …, F, f ≠  g when the quotas are nontransferable and λ f = λ g =
k, f, g = 1, …, F, f ≠  g when the quotas are transferable.
Using the conditions describing individually rational behavior in equation (5),
leads to the conclusion that the sum of the expressions in the first line in equation
(7) is equal to zero. Hence, the necessary condition for an optimal welfare level of
public services can be expressed by
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The left-hand-side reflects the expected marginal welfare gain by increasing s and
the right-hand-side measures the marginal costs with respect to s.
In order to discuss the difference between these feasible policies under the two
quota regimes and the optimal welfare allocation analyzed previously, let us com-
pare the condition in equation (7) to the third equation in (4). First, we notice that
the marginal welfare stemming from higher public services is lower when the














The existence of this moral hazard problem therefore leads to a lower level of the
public service supplied to the fishing industry in the second-best compared to the
first-best solution.
Additionally, it is seen that the sum of the marginal social income in equation
(7) is found by using the weights (1 – λ f), while the weight for all fishing units is
equal to (1 – λ ) in the first-best allocation case. Comparing the outcome for a trans-
ferable quota regime with the first-best solution, shows that in all cases where λ  ≠  k,
the marginal aggregated social income stemming from an increase in s will be dif-
ferent. If k >(<) λ , i.e., that the negative effect caused by too high level of z domi-
nates (is dominated by) the potential positive effect of an increasing n, resulting in lower
(higher) private than social expected marginal costs, then there will be a lower (higher)
level of public services in the second-best compared to the first-best solution.
Hence, if the quota price overestimates the marginal welfare gain by the last
unit caught (k > λ ) and the double moral hazard effect appears, it is unambiguously
clear that the public authorities choose a lower level of s in the second-best than in
the first-best case.
To complete the comparisons, let us take a look at the second-best solution in
the cases where the quotas are transferable and nontransferable. It is seen from
equation (7) that if the λ ’s are positively (negatively) correlated with the marginal
income with respect to s [cov(λ f,  Rs
f ) >(<) 0], the total marginal income for the fish-
ing industry with respect to s will be lower (higher) in the nontransferable than in
the transferable case. Therefore, if cov(λ f,  Rs
f ) >(<) 0, it would be advantageous for
the public authorities to choose a lower (higher) level of public services in the non-
transferable than in the transferable case. To see this, let us suppose that cov(λ f,  Rs
f )
> 0. Then the vessels which are mostly restricted in the case of nontransferable quo-
tas (i.e., the fishing units which have the highest λ -values and which are the poten-
tial buyers of quotas), are the vessels which are able to utilize a marginal increase in
the public supply most. In a nontransferable quota regime, they will not be able to
do so. However, if the vessels under a transferable quota regime which would have
sold catch quantities have the highest marginal utility of increased public supply
cov(λ f,  Rs
f ) < 0, this would make an increase in public supply more welfare improv-
ing in the nontransferable case compared to the transferable case. This would lead to
a higher level of supply of the public services. However, it seems worthwhile to
point out, that the efficiencies of the different fishing units (or the λ  levels) will
hardly be observable by the public authorities.
Concluding Remarks
According to the questions raised in the introduction we can conclude as follows: (i)
The public authorities’ engagement in safety issues is necessary in order to secure aCatch Regulation and Accident Risk 291
supply of public goods like communication and navigation systems used by all ves-
sels. In addition, to reduce accident risks, the supply of public services will increase
the production possibilities in the fishing industry. However, related to question (ii),
we have seen that the supply of public services might induce the individual rational
fishermen to behave in a way which increases risks because they may insert less of
the safety-reducing and more of the safety-increasing private inputs as long as the
total losses experienced when accidents happen are higher than the losses each of
the fishermen are faced with, i.e., moral hazard effects might occur.
It is more difficult to give a clear answer to question (iii) based on the discus-
sion of transferable and nontransferable quota regimes. We have seen that the choice
of nontransferable or the transferable quota regimes is conditional on the sizes of the
externalities and possible moral hazard effects, which, among other things, are de-
pendent on possible variations in the distribution of the total losses on internal and
external accident costs among the vessels. For instance, if the public authorities
know the size and the distribution of the total losses for all of the operating units, it
will be preferable, in order to minimize the external effects, to give most of the quo-
tas to the vessels where the external costs are small compared to firms where these
are high, and forbid the fishermen to transfer catch quantities between them.
Our analysis, based on a simple theoretical model is, as far as we know, one of
the first attempts to focus on the interesting question on how fishery and safety
regulations affect the welfare in the fishing industry. In the future, more realistic
theoretical and empirical analyses should be undertaken. For instance, in addition to
focusing on the operating decisions for the fishing firms, it is important to analyze
the effect the fishing units’ investment decisions might have on safety issues, per-
haps also when the operators’ attitude towards risks is more complicated than our
risk neutral presumption reflects. Furthermore, it would be useful to analyze the ef-
fect of other fishery regulations in addition to those explicitly focused on here. Fi-
nally, and of primary importance, we believe that empirical studies are needed in or-
der to test whether risks are affected by the actions of the fishermen and the public
authorities, and, eventually, to determine the size of such effects.
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